By Dr Felicity Gerry KC I am delighted to see our campaign for the posthumous exoneration of Christine Keeler being covered for 4 days in The Mirror. The campaign is being brought by her son Seymour Platt who was left the task of telling her real story in her will. At the height of the “Profumo Scandal” Christine was the victim of a violent assault by a man called Lucky Gordon. He was prosecuted but sacked his lawyers and represented himself. In cross examination of her, he admitted assaulting her. She told the police she had not mentioned two other witnesses because they asked her not to. On the suggestion that she had lied about about who was present, Gordon’s conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal (the court unusually expressing their belief that Christine was telling the truth). Nonetheless she was prosecuted for perjury and PCJ. She pleaded guilty and was sent to prison. She was under terrible pressure. For example, news reports account members of the public throwing eggs at her outside the Old Bailey in Stephen Ward’s trial where she was also wrongly accused of being a sex worker. Ward took his life before verdicts on whether it could be shown he was not living on her “immoral” earnings. These events framed Christine Keeler appallingly for the rest of her life, as Seymour Platt has explained in the Mirror. The law on the charges Christine faced (despite being a victim) only applies if there is a “material lie”. That Christine did not state that two other men were present when she was violently assaulted was totally irrelevant, especially as a proper investigation would have revealed they saw the attack and because her attacker admitted in court he assaulted her The Criminal Cases Review Commission is now quite properly investigating the case. The implications of the comments her silk Jeremy Hutchinson QC made at the time made it obvious she pleaded guilty when she was not, and she was shamed, unlike others whose reputation has been restored. There is a real risk that she was wrongly convicted. Sending her to prison was dreadful and she rightly deserves a posthumous exoneration. It would also go a long way to reframing a case that is the epitome of slut shaming, fitting with modern CPS guidance on violence against women and girls

Traditionally in England and Wales the defence may give an opening address at the start of the defence case, but only where evidence is to be called other than from the accused person. In many cases this means that the issues are not identified clearly until a late stage and in long cases there can be an advantage to the prosecution to dominate the trial issues. In a recent webinar we discussed this topic of delivery of defence openings / summary of issues and how defence statements can be framed to support a defence opening. This article is a summary of the key provisions discussed. Click below to read in full. Download Article now To stay up to date with insight articles, webinars and chamber news why not subscribe to Libertas Lens (our periodic newsletter) – Click here to register

The courts of England and Wales may still be dealing with the many EncroChat-related prosecutions, but technology has already moved on. While many are focused on AI and its potential for misuse, what some overlook are the networks on which these platforms operate. You may never have heard of the ‘fediverse’ but, if you practise criminal law, you should understand the basics, says Benjamin Knight. Click below to read in full. Download Article now To stay up to date with insight articles, webinars and chamber news why not subscribe to Libertas Lens (our periodic newsletter) – Click here to register

Article originally posted 9th June 2023. Updated: 18th August 2023 In England and Wales, the answer to this question is no. However, in Canada, a more robust approach is taken to procedural delay in certain circumstances. This article discusses delay to the criminal trial process, once it has begun. This is to be distinguished from the timely prosecution of certain categories of offence which come to light or are reported many years after they were committed, as occurred e.g., in Sawoniuk who was tried and convicted some 50 odd years after his war crimes. England and Wales Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that every person charged with a criminal offence has the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal within a reasonable time. The reasonable time right is not unqualified, but it has been held to be both independent of and separate to the co-existing rights in article 6 to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. It has been given effect in the domestic laws of England and Wales by the Human Rights Act 1998 which requires public authorities to act in a convention compliant manner. Therefore, as far as an individual charged with a criminal offence is concerned, and in very broad terms, this means that their convention rights not only trump the common law where there may be conflict between the two, but that prosecuting authorities and criminal courts must act in a manner which is compatible with their convention rights. In most cases, time starts to run from the moment a person is charged or summonsed and it continues until the conclusion of any appeals, including appeals against confiscation orders. In order to establish a breach of the reasonable time requirement, an accused is not required to demonstrate prejudice; once a breach has been established, however, the concept of prejudice looms large when the criminal court comes to consider the appropriate remedy for the breach. Typically, this is because an accused whose reasonable time right has been breached, will apply for a stay of the proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court, thereby bringing into play ordinary and well-settled abuse of process principles. The established cases in England and Wales which deal with the appropriate remedy for a breach of the reasonable time requirement are: Attorney General’s Reference (No.1 of 1990) [1992] 95 Cr. App. R. 296, Attorney General’s Reference (No.2 of 2001) [2004] 2 A.C. 72, R v S. (S.P.) [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 23 and R v F. (S.) [2011] 2 Cr. App. R. 28. Taken together, the following principles emerge: (i) a permanent stay is the exception rather than the rule; (ii) there should be no stay in the absence of serious prejudice to the defendant being tried; (iii) the court is under a duty to regulate and control its proceedings to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial, notwithstanding the delay. (iv) a permanent stay of proceedings should only ever be ordered in circumstances where the defendant cannot receive a fair trial or where, for a compelling reason, it is no longer fair for the defendant to be tried; (v) in the latter case, a permanent stay will never be warranted in circumstances where a lesser remedy to mark the breach will suffice. Canada Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, contained in Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982, provides that, “any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time.” Section 11(d) provides for the co-existing rights to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. Prior to 2016 and the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Jordan, [2016] SCC 27 (CanLii), violations of the section 11(b) charter right were determined according to the “the Morin framework”, following the Court’s earlier decision in R v Morin, [1992] CanLii 89 (SCC). The Morin Framework Morin was a straightforward drink-driving case from the state of Ontario which enjoyed a delay of 14.5 months between the defendant being charged and her trial taking place. Her counsel had requested the earliest possible trial date. On the day of trial, counsel applied to stay the proceedings alleging a violation of the defendant’s section 11(b) constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time. This application was dismissed and the defendant was convicted. Her case progressed all the way up the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”). The Court held that in determining an alleged section 11(b) violation, it was not apposite to apply a mechanistic or mathematical formula. Instead, a judge was required to balance the protection afforded to the individual by section 11(b) against other factors which inevitably lead to delay. These other factors were: the length of the delay; any waiver of time periods by the defence; the reasons for the delay, including (a) the inherent time requirements of the case, (b) the actions of the accused, (c) the actions of the Crown, (d) limitations on institutional resources, and (e) other reasons for delay; and prejudice to the accused. The majority stated that unreasonable delay should only be investigated if the period was long enough to raise an issue as to its reasonableness. Short periods of delay would only be capable of raising an issue if a defendant could demonstrate prejudice. With respect to limitations on institutional resources in particular, the Court suggested guidelines of 8 to 10 months for provincial courts to determine matters and 6 to 8 months, post-committal, for trial in the higher courts. It made clear, however, that these were guidelines only, not intended to operate as a limitation period and that they were to be weighed in the scales with the other factors which they had identified. The Court recognised that the practical application of these guidelines would be influenced by the extent to which an accused might suffer prejudice. The Court noted that the guidelines would require adjustment by regional courts to reflect local conditions and that they would also need to be adjusted from time to time to reflect changing circumstances. The Court observed that prejudice might be inferred from the length of the delay: the longer the delay, the more likely an inference of prejudice. However, if prejudice could not be inferred by the court or proved by an accused, any suggestion of an alleged violation would be seriously undermined. The protection afforded by section 11(b) was to ensure that trials were brought on swiftly and to minimise prejudice, not to avoid trials on their merits from ever taking place. A defendant’s attitude to securing a timely trial was an important consideration to be weighed in the scales. A balance had to be struck between the public interest, which demands that persons charged with offences should be brought to trial, and the accused’s interest in the prompt and efficient determination of criminal proceedings. Prior to the SCC’s decision in Morin, an extreme example of a section 11(b) violation which resulted in a stay is to be found in R v Rahey [1987] CanLii 52 (SCC). The provincial court judge presiding over the matter caused an 11-month delay after the prosecution had closed its case and the defendant had asked for a directed verdict of acquittal. Initially, the accused did not object to the delay. After 9 months, he wrote to the Crown requesting that it should press the judge for a decision. He then alleged that his constitutional rights were being violated and requested a withdrawal of the charges. These requests were refused. Instead, the Crown made an application to the superior court for mandamus to compel the provincial judge to deliver a ruling. The day before the provincial judge was due to give the ruling, the defendant made an application to the superior court for an order dismissing the charges on the basis that his section 11(b) constitutional right had been violated by the provincial court. The superior court judge granted the defendant’s application and held that the trial judge’s delay had caused him serious prejudice by frustrating his ability to (i) conduct his defence, and (ii) carry on business while under a financial restraint order. The superior court judge concluded that the only appropriate remedy for the breach was a dismissal of the charges. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and directed that the trial in the provincial court should continue. It found that the evidence of prejudice was “insubstantial and entirely speculative.” The SCC allowed the accused’s appeal and ordered a stay of the provincial court proceedings. It is of some note that 6 of the 9 SCC Justices empaneled to hear this appeal were of the view that a stay of proceedings was the minimum remedy because the provincial court had lost its jurisdiction to continue trying the accused when it became the author of the section 11(b) violation. R v Jordan [2016] SCC 27 – The New Framework Jordan was charged in December 2008 with offences relating to the supply of controlled drugs. His trial ended in February 2013. He made an application under section 11(b) for a stay of the proceedings on account of the delay. The trial judge applied the Morin framework, dismissed the application and the defendant was convicted. He appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed his appeal. The SCC allowed his appeal, set aside his conviction, and ordered a permanent stay of proceedings. The SCC introduced a new concept of presumptive ceilings beyond which any delay is presumed to be unreasonable unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying it. Once a presumptive ceiling has been exceeded, a permanent stay will follow unless the crown can justify the delay. There is no longer a need for an accused to demonstrate prejudice. Unlike the position in England and Wales, accused persons do not have to invoke abuse of process principles and prove on balance of probabilities that they cannot have a fair trial or that it is no longer fair for them to tried. Unless there are exceptional circumstances to justify it, exceeding the presumptive ceiling, in and of itself, leads to a permanent stay and the burden is on the Crown to justify any delay under the exceptional circumstances exception. The majority of the SCC opted for a new framework stating that the Morin framework, “…had given rise to both doctrinal and practical problems, contributing to a culture of delay and complacency towards it. Doctrinally, the Morin framework is too unpredictable, too confusing, and too complex. It has itself become a burden on already over‑burdened trial courts. From a practical perspective, the Morin framework’s after‑the‑fact rationalization of delay does not encourage participants in the justice system to take preventative measures to address inefficient practices and resourcing problems.” “A new framework is therefore required for applying s. 11(b)… At the heart of this new framework is a presumptive ceiling beyond which delay — from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial — is presumed to be unreasonable unless exceptional circumstances justify it. The presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry).” The new framework is applied as follows: Defence delay (caused or waived) does not count towards the presumptive ceiling. Once the applicable presumptive ceiling has been exceeded, the Crown bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. If the Crown cannot do this, a stay will follow. “Exceptional circumstances” are circumstances which lie outside the Crown’s control. They must be reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and not reasonably capable of remedy. Whether circumstances are exceptional will depend on the trial judge’s good sense and experience. In general, exceptional circumstances will fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases. If the exceptional circumstance relates to a discrete event (such as an illness or unexpected event at trial), the delay reasonably attributable to that event is subtracted from the total delay. If the exceptional circumstance arises from case complexity, the delay is reasonable and no further analysis is required. An exceptional circumstance is the only basis upon which the Crown can justify a delay that exceeds the presumptive ceiling. The seriousness or gravity of the offence cannot be relied on, nor can chronic institutional delay. The absence of prejudice to an accused person cannot be used to justify delays after the presumptive ceiling has been breached. Only circumstances that are genuinely outside the Crown’s control and ability to remedy may excuse prolonged delay. Below the presumptive ceiling, the burden is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that: (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. Absent these two factors, the s. 11(b) application must fail. Stays beneath the presumptive ceiling should only be granted in clear cases. Turning to Jordan’s appeal, the total delay from the date on which he was charged to the end of his trial was 49.5 months. From this, the Court deducted a 4-month adjournment period for a delay which had been caused by the defendant changing his counsel shortly before his trial was due to begin. A further 6 weeks was deducted on account of a further delay occasioned when the defendant’s counsel was unavailable. This left a delay of 44 months which the Court found “vastly exceeded” the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior court cases under its new framework. While there were some complexities to the defendant’s case, they were not of a kind that could reasonably justify this level of delay. Accordingly, as the Crown was unable to demonstrate that the delay was reasonable, the only remedy for the breach was a stay of the proceedings. Discussion On any view, the Canadian presumptive ceilings are very generous for most criminal cases being tried in the higher and lower courts. They amount to this: superior court cases must conclude within 2.5 years from the date on which a suspect is charged and provincial court cases must finish within 18 months. These are significant time periods for the vast majority of criminal cases. They were set with a view to tackling chronic delays and a culture of complacency to delay which had become embedded in some parts of the Canadian system. The SCC spoke of the need for everyone involved in the Canadian criminal justice system to address inefficient working practices and adequacy of resource problems. In considering the potential utility, therefore, of the Canadian model to practice in England and Wales, one probably needs to consider, first, whether there are, in fact, any Crown Court cases presently taking longer than 2.5 years from charge to conclusion? And in Magistrates and Youth Courts, whether there are any cases that are not being disposed of within 18 months? There may not be that many. Judges and list officers in England and Wales have consistently shown a determination to have trials warned or fixed in the court calendar as soon as possible. Most trials, including those requiring High Court or specialist ticketed judges, used to be warned or fixed for trial within no more than 6 to 9 months of the PCMH; many within less time than this depending on the court centre. Cases were not infrequently moved between different court centres, both on and off circuit, to ensure that they could be tried as quickly as possible, regardless of counsel’s convenience and often to the chagrin of busy counsel. So, in a sense, the Canadian model may not be a good fit to the system in England and Wales. However, should the criminal justice system in England and Wales ever find itself overwhelmed or close to breaking point, to the extent that criminal cases are no longer capable of being listed and disposed of within the reasonable time frames that judges and list officers applied historically and did their best to adhere to, a brave counsel somewhere might wish to take a stab at presenting the Canadian model, with the ceilings suitably adjusted to reflect our own historic standards of efficiency and expedition. Who knows, it might just find favour with some Judges in some cases without the need to demonstrate prejudice and unfairness. In relation to substantial complex fraud cases which in some instances can conceivably take longer than 2.5 years to reach a conclusion, under the Canadian model the complexity of these cases is deemed capable of amounting to an exceptional circumstance justifying the reasonableness of the delay such that no further inquiry is required. Having said this, it is probably fair to observe that there must come a point at which even complex cases should not be allowed to drift on if they cannot be made ready for trial and accommodated by a crown court centre within a reasonable time. Rahey and Morin were considered by the House of Lords in Attorney General’s Reference (No.2 of 2001) [2004] 2 A.C. 72, as indeed was the New Zealand Court of Appeal case, Martin v Tauranga District Court [1995] 2 NZLR 419, in which an approach similar to that in Canada was taken. Lord Bingham described the argument in favour of a permanent stay as a powerful one and opined that it was not at all surprising that such a powerful argument had been accepted by highly respected Courts around the world. However, in addition to the compelling public interest in the determination of criminal charges, he provided four reasons why it should not be accepted in England and Wales: the right which a defendant has is to a hearing which should have certain characteristics; he said it would be anomalous if a breach of the reasonable time requirement had more far-reaching consequences than a breach of a defendant’s other section 6(1) rights e.g., the right to a fair trial. Lord Bingham cited the example of a defendant being convicted after an unfair trial, the Court of Appeal quashing the conviction because of the unfairness but nevertheless ordering a re-trial if a fair trial is still possible. automatic termination of proceedings cannot sensibly be applied in civil proceedings; in practice, automatic termination of proceedings has been shown to weaken the requirement. Citing the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Scottish case of Dyer v Watson [2004] 1 A.C. 379, Lord Bingham pointed out that the convention is directed to breaches of basic human rights, not to departures from an ideal, and that the threshold of proving a breach of the reasonable time requirement is a high one, not easily crossed. Lord Bingham expressed a concern that should a breach result in an automatic stay, judges might set the threshold at an unacceptably high level because the idea of setting free dangerous criminals or those who are guilty of serious crime on account of delay has always been repugnant; finally, a close analysis of the ECHR jurisprudence did not support the contention that a breach of the reasonable time requirement should lead to an automatic stay of the proceedings. Adrian Kayne 18th August 2023 Download Article now To stay up to date with insight articles, webinars and chamber news why not subscribe to Libertas Lens (our periodic newsletter) – Click here to register

Case notes from Sarah Day and Marie Spenwyn providing an update as to recent key sentencing developments including a significant case affecting imposition of custodial sentences given capacity in prisons, approach to sentencing those who are sentenced when adults offending committed when a child and new sentencing guidelines.   Prison population and sentencing: Summary of recent Statement from the Chairman of the Sentencing Council The Chairman of the Sentencing Council, Lord Justice William Davis, has recently issued a statement in relation to concerns over the high prison population, following the Court of Appeal’s judgment on 3 March 2023 in R v Arie Ali [2023] EWCA Crim 232.  The case of Ali clarifies that when sentencing an offence that crosses the threshold for a short custodial sentence where there continues to be pressure on prison capacity, as there is at present, the courts can take into account the impact of the current prison population levels to determine whether to suspend a sentence or impose a community order as opposed to a short custodial sentence.   Quoting a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister to the Lord Chief Justice in February 2023, the judgment highlights that operating close to prison capacity has consequences for the conditions in which prisoners are held.  Most particularly, they may well be further away from home (affecting the ability for family visits), be in crowded conditions and have reduced access to rehabilitative programmes. Both the case of Ali and the subsequent statement by the Chairman make clear that the high prison population is an additional factor which can be taken into account when deciding whether a short custodial sentence must be imposed immediately or whether it can be suspended.  It is not a factor which requires all short prison sentences to be suspended, as ever, that must be based on all the factors pertinent to the sentencing exercise.  It would appear that the courts will be reliant on the government to communicate when prison conditions have returned to a more normal state. As a final note, during a recent sentencing exercise in front of Lord Justice Edis sitting at Nottingham Crown Court, he indicated that the issue was only in relation to the male prison population.  It is notable, however, that the statement from the Chairman is not limited in that way so it remains to be seen how this will be applied throughout the courts. Sentencing adults for offences committed when a child From the 17th March 2023 R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281 is an important judgement in which the Court of Appeal has clarified the approach that must be adopted when sentencing an adult for offences committed as a child.  In this case, the court heard five appeals together, which each concerned sexual offences and in which the question the court sought to resolve was the correct approach to sentencing an adult for an offence committed as a child. Each of the five sentences were reduced by the Court of Appeal. A number of principles for sentencing those who offended as children but are sentenced as adults can be distilled (at paragraph 32): The Court rejected the submission of the respondent that the Sentencing Council’s Overarching Guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People can only be applied where there is “relative temporal proximity”. The Court confirmed that whatever the age of the offender at the time of conviction and sentence, the Overarching Guideline is relevant and must be applied (in accordance with Section 59(1) of the Sentencing Code) unless the court is satisfied it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so. The court must have regard to the maximum sentence which was available at or shortly after the time of the offending. The court must take as its starting point the sentence which it considers was likely to have been imposed if the child offender had been sentenced shortly after the offence. If in all the circumstances of the case the child offender could not in law have been sentenced (at the time of his offending) to any form of custodial sentence, then no custodial sentence may be imposed; Where some form of custody was available, the court is not necessarily bound by the maximum applicable to the child offender. The court should, however, only exceed that maximum where there is good reason to do so. The Court emphasised that the mere fact that the offender has now attained adulthood is not in itself a good reason. The Court further stated they found it very difficult to think of circumstances in which a good reason could properly be found, and thus respectfully doubted the decision in the case of R v. Forbes and others [2016] EWCA Crim 1388 in this one respect. However, the point was not specifically argued in these appeals and so the Court has indicated that a firm decision about it must therefore await a case in which it is directly raised. In each case, the issue for the court to resolve will be whether there is good reason to impose on the adult a sentence more severe than he would have been likely to have received if he had been sentenced soon after the offence as a child. The starting points taken as set out in the points above, may not necessarily be the end point of sentence as they may increase or decrease. As the court is sentencing an adult, it must have regard to the purposes of sentencing set out in section 57 of the Sentencing Code. This case adds to a line of authorities from the Court of Appeal in cases such as R v Ghafoor [2002] EWCA Crim 1857 which emphasise that those who offend when under 18 should be treated differently from those who offend as adults and reviews them in the light of the overarching sentencing guidelines for children now in place since July 2017.  The Court stated that this is in recognition of the fact that “in general, children are less culpable, and less morally responsible, for their acts than adults” as stated in R v Limon [2022] EWCA Crim 39.  They therefore require a different approach and are not to be treated as if they were “just cut-down versions of adult offenders”.  Of significance is the expression of these principles as applicable not only to cases where the offender has relatively recently crossed the threshold to adulthood, but where an adult is being sentenced – potentially decades later – for offences committed as a child.  It is no doubt therefore that this will be a significant guideline case and of assistance to practitioners facing a sentencing scenario where the offender has either recently crossed the age threshold and must be sentenced as an adult, or whether the offending was historic offending which took place when a child and is of particular application to sexual offences. New guidelines on sentencing for sale of knives to persons under 18 in force Since the 1st April 2023 two new guidelines relating to the sale of knives by individuals and organisations (offences under s141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988) to those under 18 have been in force.  In circumstances where there had not previously been any guideline in place for these offences (punishable by a fine for organisations but with a maximin of 6 months imprisonment for individuals) the new guidelines are designed to allow for more consistency in the approach to sentencing these offences across the courts.  There is one level of harm recognised the same risk of harm (to individuals and the wider community) is risked in relation to every sale.  The offence is a summary only one in either case. The guideline for organisations includes specifics as to how they implement training and measures to verify age both in person and online.   The sentencing ranges for organisations now provided will likely result in higher fines being imposed.   As stated in the forward to the published response to the consultations these offences are not frequently prosecuted but have the potential for serious consequences.  For offences that concern large quantities of knives of where there is ‘deliberate or reckless marketing of knives to children’ the guidelines would not apply. New guidelines on sentencing child cruelty Also in force from the 1st April 2023 is a guideline that updates those previously in force from 2019 specifically to take account of the change to the maximum sentences resulting from the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 applying to offences committed after the 28th June 2022.   There is now a new level of “very high culpability” relating to both causing or allowing the death of a child (now life imprisonment) and causing or allowing serious harm/child cruelty (now 14 years).   Download Article now To stay up to date with insight articles, webinars and chamber news why not subscribe to Libertas Lens (our periodic newsletter) – Click here to register

Discussing the law on restitution, repatriation and reparations, Felicity Gerry KC and Fahrid Chishty have published an article in the prestigious Eastern Eye on centuries of history, how we should approach disputes over cultural heritage and whether they can lay claim to the Koh I Noor diamond? You can read more on the Eastern Eye website.

With world leaders set to meet in London later this spring, all eyes are on the ICC. As the Investigation into the Situation in Ukraine develops, theorists and practitioners of international law have speculated as to the scope of potential charges against Russian officials. Prevailing discourse has focussed its analysis on a range of traditional atrocity crimes – genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – but where do crimes against cultural heritage fit within this matrix? And to what extent can such conduct, if evidentially made out, be prosecuted at the Hague? In this article, Fahrid Chishty deconstructs these critical yet understudied questions. Fahrid has significant experience in the law relating to crimes against art and antiquities, having advised clients on countering transnational trafficking operations and cultural destruction redress. He has previously shared his expertise in relation to the Armenia-Azerbaijan litigation at the ICJ and the ‘blood antiquities’ crisis facing Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2023. On 24 February 2022, the Kremlin declared its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Its objective was purportedly to ‘demilitarise and de-nazify’ President Zelensky’s regime. At the time of writing, the war endures, with no signs of a ceasefire on the horizon. The implications of the conflict for trade, energy and agriculture – on the continent and beyond – have been profound. Yet negligible attention has been paid to the destruction or misappropriation of Ukraine’s cultural heritage in the theatre of operations. With the International Criminal Court (ICC) poised to deliver its preliminary findings vis-à-vis its Investigation into the Situation in Ukraine, the world expects the evidential picture to support the indictment of the Russian chain of command – notwithstanding the fact that key issues relating to immunities and jurisdiction remain unresolved. While criminal charges brought against Moscow’s leadership may be framed in terms of alleged atrocities committed against civilians – principally, mass killing, torture, abduction, arbitrary detention and sexual violence – calls are mounting in some quarters for the Prosecutor’s description of the charges to also enumerate alleged crimes against Ukraine’s cultural heritage. Factual matrix According to UNESCO, 218 cultural sites have been partially or totally destroyed in Ukraine since February: 95 religious buildings, 78 historical buildings, 18 monuments, 17 museums and 10 libraries. Ukrainian officials state that these were intentional, strategic strikes and amount to cultural genocide. Moreover, Russian troops stand accused of having pillaged swathes of cultural artefacts from museums and private residences nationally. According to one allegation, Russian soldiers forcibly removed Ukraine’s prized collection of Scythian jewellery – a series of golden ornaments dating from the bronze-age Steppes – from the Melitopol Museum of Local History. A diadem dating from the rule of Attila the Hun (d. 453 AD) was also allegedly looted. Ukraine’s position is plain: Russia is intent on extinguishing Kiev’s independent cultural identity and expunging its peoples’ historical footprint. The Minister of Culture has called these actions war crimes. On 20 October 2022 a European Parliament Resolution described Russian actions as ‘an attempt to eradicate the identity and culture of a sovereign nation, also through strategic and targeted acts of destruction on cultural heritage sites, constituting a war crime under the 1954 Convention to which both countries are signatories.’ In this context, if the ICC Investigation evidence is inculpatory, can we expect the Russian leadership to face trial for war crimes committed specifically in relation to Ukraine’s cultural heritage? Legal framework The destruction of cultural heritage during times of war is sadly not a new phenomenon. At various junctures in history, international law has penalised the use of violence against buildings, objects or artefacts having cultural or historical importance. The Nuremberg Trials heard evidence relating to Nazi leaders’ confiscation, desecration and destruction of cultural heritage. The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954 first established a duty on States Parties to respect and safeguard cultural property in times of military hostilities. This article focuses specifically on three war crimes contrary to the Rome Statute 1998. First, Article 8(2)(b)(ix) criminalises the intentional direction of attacks on ‘buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.’ This provision is, prima facie, engaged; Russia is alleged to have intentionally directed attacks against monuments, museums and houses of worship inter alia. Whether it truly bites will turn on the probative value of the evidence. What of venues that are not expressly listed in the provision? Sporting venues, community centres, cemeteries and parks are potential species of cultural heritage that are not adumbrated in Article 8(2)(b)(ix). The second provision, Article 8(2)(b)(ii), provides a solution. A lex generalis provision, Article 8(2)(b)(ii) classifies the intentional direction of attacks against ‘civilian objects’ as also a war crime. A civilian object is defined as object which is not a ‘military objective’, meaning that it does not by its nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action, and its destruction, capture or neutralisation does not offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances Accordingly, potential cultural heritage sites that are not susceptible to Article 8(2)(b)(ix) may fall within the ambit of Article 8(2)(b)(ii) where it can be proven that there was no effective contribution to military action and its destruction did not offer a definite military advantage. Lastly, Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) criminalises pillaging, defined as the appropriation of certain property without consent for private or personal use. Russian responses On the basis of the above, the Rome Statute plainly provides a basis for bringing charges against Russian officials in relation to crimes against cultural heritage. However, it will be for a Trial Chamber to determine on the evidence whether the offences are made out. As such, it is important to examine potential Russian responses to the charges at trial. First, Russia may plead that Article 8(2)(b)(ix) has no relevance on the basis that Russian officials did not intentionally direct attacks against protected objects. That is to say, Ukrainian cultural heritage sites sustained damage as a result of bilateral military strikes and not unilateral Russian action. Accordingly, the damage inflicted was, on this interpretation, incidental and collateral. While tragic, it may be put that this is not a war crime within the meaning of the provision. Alternatively, the Russia may plead the ‘military objectives’ defence. This would entail accepting that attacks were intentionally directed at Ukrainian cultural heritage sites, but that those attacks were justified on the basis that the sites in question made an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offered a definite military advantage in the circumstances. According to this position, cultural heritage sites were mobilised for war and therefore dispossessed of their status as protected objects at the material time. That is to say, churches, mosques and museums were militarised and repurposed as pseudo-garrisons from which Ukrainian armed forces and insurgents operated. Lastly, in relation to pillaging, Russia may challenge the nature of the alleged appropriation carried out. While the evidence may paint a picture of Russian troops forcibly removing art and antiquities from Ukraine’s museums, the defence may plead that these were necessary safeguarding and protection measures. The relocation of cultural assets in wartime may be a military necessity. As such, it may be asserted that the alleged pillaging was justified and does not constitute a war crime contrary to Article 8(2)(b)(xvi). These lines of defence are, ultimately, speculative and if pleaded, may not be insurmountable. Whether or not the charges will result in the conviction of Russian officials will, of course, be fact-sensitive and dependent on the evidence. However, the very fact that the charges may contain counts relating to war crimes against cultural heritage is a step in the right direction. Litigating the allegations may not only go towards securing justice vis-à-vis the destruction of heritage of humankind in Ukraine – it will also invite critical judicial guidance on important yet understudied issues intersecting international criminal law and cultural protection. Download this article as a PDF here

This Article by Dr Felicity Gerry KC accompanies our Libertas Chambers webinar on closing prisons which you can watch here – Libertas YouTube The webinar explored penal policy and prisoner potential with Andrea Coomber KC(Hon), CEO of the Howard League for Penal Reform, Clare McGregor, Founder of Coaching Inside and Out, Abi Andrews, Employability Manager at The Longford Trust. Presented by our Dr Felicity Gerry KC, these pioneering women discussed legal services as a lifeline and the impact alternatives such as coaching and employability projects, can have for those who find themselves ‘behind bars’. Click below to read in full. Download Article now To stay up to date with insight articles, webinars and chamber news why not subscribe to Libertas Lens (our periodic newsletter) – Click here to register